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Summary
Officials of the Bush Administration believe military action against Iraq may be
necessary to eliminate threats posed by the Iraqi regime to the U.S. and international
communities.  In October 2002, Congress passed a joint resolution (H.J.Res. 114) giving
the President authority to use force if necessary to eliminate threats posed by Saddam
Hussein’s Iraq.  Some Members of Congress, commentators, and analysts question the
Administration’s rationale for military action or favor delaying it to allow U.N. weapons
inspectors more time to complete their findings in Iraq.  This report summarizes
arguments advanced by the Administration and by critics of the Administration’s
position.  It will be updated as the situation continues to develop.  For further reading,
see CRS Report RL31339,  Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, by Kenneth
Katzman.
Overview
Discussion continues between the Bush Administration and Congress and in the
international community about the rationale for military action against the Iraqi regime
and the feasibility of such action.  Supporters of a military option believe a campaign to
oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein is probably the only way to compel Iraq’s
compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions, eliminate its weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), and terminate its ability to support international terrorism.
Opponents argue that resumption of U.N. weapons inspections with unfettered access
throughout Iraq may achieve the goal of ridding Iraq of WMD without a costly military
campaign, which could prove difficult to implement, and also could destabilize U.S. allies
in the region and divert resources from other phases of the war against terrorism.
President Bush has repeatedly called for regime change in Iraq.  In his speech before
the U.N. General Assembly on September 12, 2002, the President emphasized the dangers
posed by Iraq’s programs to develop WMD and urged the United Nations to live up to its
responsibilities by enforcing previous U.N. Security Council resolutions that Iraq has
ignored.  On October 10 and 11, respectively, the House and Senate passed H.J.Res. 114
(P.L. 107-243), which authorizes the President to use the U.S. Armed Forces to defend
the national security of the United States against the continuing Iraqi threat and enforce
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1 The U.S. Administration believes that the wording of Resolution 1441 allows President Bush
to mount an attack without going back to the Security Council if Iraq fails to comply with the
terms of the resolution.  Some other countries believe a second resolution specifically authorizing
the use of force would be required.
all relevant U.N. Security Council sanctions regarding Iraq.  At the international level, on
November 8, 2002, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1441,
which imposed a revised and more stringent weapons inspection regime on Iraq, required
Iraq to submit a comprehensive declaration of all its WMD programs within 30 days, and
warned of “serious consequences” if Iraq fails to cooperate.1  U.N. weapons inspectors
returned to Iraq in November 2002 after an absence of four years.
Rationale Advanced by Administration Officials
Credibility of U.N. Pronouncements.  Iraq has defied at least 16 U.N. Security
Council resolutions enacted since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, according to a
position paper published by the Administration on September 12, 2002.  Iraq has
concealed or falsified information on its programs to develop weapons of mass
destruction (WMD); failed to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors; failed to account
for missing persons and property stolen during Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait; continued to
repress its population; and periodically supported international terrorism.  By all
indications, senior Administration officials believe it will likely take military action to end
Iraq’s continued defiance of demands embodied in U.N. resolutions.  (See CRS Issue
Brief IB92117, Iraq: Compliance, Sanctions, and U.S. Policy.)  In his address to the U.N.
General Assembly on September 12, President Bush posed the question: “Are Security
Council resolutions to be honored and enforced, or cast aside without consequence?”  In
his State of the Union address on January 29, 2003, the President called on the United
Nations to “fulfill its charter and stand by its demand that Iraq disarm.”
Threat Posed by Lethal Weapons.  The Administration and its supporters
maintain that Iraq’s programs to develop WMD pose a threat to U.S. interests and allies.
Iraq is known to have developed biological and chemical warfare agents and used the
latter against its own population and neighboring Iran during the 1980s.  During the Gulf
war in 1991, Iraq fired conventional medium- and long-range missiles at Israel and Saudi
Arabia.  Many U.S. officials and other commentators believe that Iraq was on the verge
of developing a nuclear weapons capability before its defeat in the Gulf war and that it
retains considerable expertise in this field.  In their view, post-war inspections did not
fully reveal the extent of Iraq’s weapons programs, which in some cases were reported by
Iraqi defectors.  Lacking an air-tight inspection regime, which Iraq has managed to
obstruct in the past, military action may be the only way to eliminate Iraq’s WMD
capabilities and the threats they pose.  Reports submitted to the U.N. Security Council by
U.N. weapons inspectors on January 27, 2003 credit Iraq with cooperating in the process
of weapons inspections, but urge Iraq to shift from “passive support” to a more proactive
role in helping clear up remaining questions about its WMD programs.
Terrorist Ties.  Iraq has appeared on the State Department’s annual list of
countries supporting international terrorism since August 1990.  Although no positive
proof has emerged to link Iraq to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there have been unconfirmed
reports of contacts between Iraqi agents and representatives of the Al Qaeda organization.
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2 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice made similar comments.  Some unnamed U.S.
officials have expressed skepticism regarding these reports, and other commentators believe any
Al Qaeda members in Iraq are located in the northern Kurdish zone, which is outside Saddam
Hussein’s control.  See Rowan Scarborough, “Rumsfeld Links Al Qaeda To Saddam,” The
Washington Times, Sept. 27, 2002, p. A1; Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Officials Revive Debate On
Iraq-Al Qaeda Ties,” The Washington Post, Sept. 27, 2002, p. A19; Barbara Slavin and John
Diamond, “Experts Skeptical Of Reports On Al-Qaeda-Baghdad Link,” USA Today, Sept. 27,
2002, p. 4.
3 Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Readies Training Of Hussein Foes,” The Washington Post, Sept. 26,
2002, p. A1.
In late September 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cited “evolving”
intelligence reports indicating that Iraq has given safe haven to members of Al Qaeda and
supported their efforts to obtain WMD.2  President Bush echoed these charges in his State
of the Union address in January 2003.  Iraq has also been accused of mounting various
terrorist actions, including an abortive attempt to assassinate former President Bush in
1993.  In this context, military reprisals against Iraq could support the President’s
worldwide campaign against terrorism by dealing a blow to one of its state sponsors.
Regime Change.  Ever since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, U.S. Administrations have
called for replacement of Saddam Hussein’s regime; Congress, too, has endorsed regime
change by enacting the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA) in 1998 (P.L. 105-338).  Saddam’s tight
control over his military and security apparatus, however, makes it unlikely that he could
be overthrown by a coup or by other non-military measures.  A U.S.-led military
campaign, the Bush Administration contends, may be the only way to achieve Saddam’s
overthrow and replacement by a more friendly and hopefully democratic regime.
Administration officials suggest that such a regime could serve as a model for
democratization in the Arab World.  The U.S. role in the creation of a democratic Iraq
could enhance U.S. prestige in the Middle East, as President Bush stated in a speech to
the U.N. General Assembly in September 2002, by “inspiring reforms throughout the
Muslim world.”
Internal Support.  Senior U.S. officials believe a majority of Iraqis would
welcome the overthrow of a regime that has long oppressed them.  Disaffection from the
Ba’thist regime is particularly strong among the Kurds, who have been leading targets of
repression, but is reportedly also rife among other segments of the Iraqi population.
Although many commentators discount the effectiveness of Iraq’s divided opposition
groups, these groups have taken recent steps to heal rifts and coordinate their efforts,
though with mixed results. On December 9, 2002, President Bush decided to release
remaining funds made available for Iraqi opposition groups under the Iraq Liberation Act
of 1998.  Proponents of a wider role for the Iraqi opposition suggest that under an
optimum scenario, it could play a role similar to that of the Afghan Northern Alliance,
which helped U.S. forces topple the Taliban regime.3  (Many observers, however, are
skeptical about the applicability of the Afghanistan model to Iraq.)
Growing International Support.  Although friendly Middle East states continue
to voice opposition to major military action against Iraq, some commentators have long
maintained that regional leaders would quietly welcome a move against Saddam, if it
quickly and fully achieved the overthrow of his regime.  Many believe that other key
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4 Although statements by senior Saudi officials have been non-committal, some officials have
implied that the door may be ajar at least to limited use of facilities in Saudi Arabia by U.S.
forces in the event of a war with Iraq, if authorized by the United Nations.  Other reports allege
that Saudi officials are discussing the possibility of persuading Saddam Hussein to go into exile,
thereby averting a war.  See for example Christopher Marquis, “Saudi Prince Encourages Exile
Agreement For Hussein’s Departure,” The New York Times, January 30, 2003.
5 Eric Schmitt, “Three Retired Generals Warn of Peril in Attacking Iraq Without Backing of
U.N.,” The New York Times, Sept. 24, 2002.
6 Brent Scowcroft, “Don’t Attack Saddam,” The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 15, 2002, p. A12.
7 In a press conference on December 13, 2002, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Richard
Armitage, pointed out that North Korea has not been active in terrorism since 1987 and that local
allies such as Japan and South Korea provide a framework for diplomacy in dealing with North
Korea.
countries will eventually support military action, since they will not want to be perceived
as “soft” on Saddam or implacably opposed to the policies of the United States as the sole
remaining superpower.  On January 23, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell told
reporters that “[m]any nations have already expressed a willingness to serve in a coalition
of the willing.”  According to the press, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told
a Senate committee on January 30 that more than 20 nations have offered full or partial
basing, transit, or overflight rights to allied forces if a war with Iraq occurs and that nine
nations have said their troops will participate.  In this connection, there have been signs
that some moderate Arab states may be softening their previous opposition to allowing
large-scale U.S. military operations from their territory against Iraq, provided a military
campaign were authorized by a U.N. resolution.4
Views of Critics of Administration Policies
Premature Action.  A number of commentators including former high ranking
U.S. officials believe that advocates of a military option have not made a convincing case
in support of imminent military action against Iraq.  According to this view, a military
campaign may be premature until the reconstituted inspection teams have fully analyzed
Iraqi WMD programs, a process that could take some months.  Several former U.S.
military leaders have suggested that the United States should exhaust diplomatic options
before mounting a military campaign against Iraq.5 One former official noted that if
Saddam refuses unfettered inspections or if the inspections uncover compelling evidence
of a nuclear weapons capability, then the United States would have a more persuasive
case to use military force against Iraq.6  In a report to the U.N. Security Council on
January 27, 2003, the chief U.N. nuclear inspector suggested that allowing his team a few
more months to complete and verify its findings “would be a valuable investment in
peace.”  Some observers have contrasted the high priority given by the U.S.
Administration to Iraq with its lower-key reaction to recent revelations that North Korea
has resumed work on nuclear weapons.7
Effect on Anti-Terrorism Campaign and Alliance Relations.  Skeptics of
the Administration’s approach maintain that a major campaign against Iraq could detract
from U.S. efforts to pursue other phases of its war on terrorism.  They assert that
continued low level conflict in Afghanistan argues against diverting major military
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8 U.S. planners reportedly are considering various ways to mitigate this threat: keeping the
invasion force relatively small, assembling much of the force beyond the range of Saddam’s
missiles, and keeping troop movements as stealthy as possible.  Thomas E. Ricks, “War Plans
Target Hussein Power Base,” The Washington Post, Sept. 22, 2002, p. A1.
9 “USA–Zinni Comes Out Against Hawks,” Periscope Daily Defense News Capsules, Aug. 29,
2002.  (Administration supporters maintain that the risks of destabilization or a mass uprising of
the “Arab street” are exaggerated; neither eventuality occurred after the 1990-1991 Gulf war.)
resources to another area of operations.  Most Arab and Muslim states, opposed in
principle to U.S. action against Iraq, might be less willing to continue cooperating with
the United States in its on-going attempts to root out Al Qaeda cells and shut off sources
of terrorist funding.  Elsewhere, Britain is one of the few countries to express willingness
to join in military action, and other European allies have expressed reservations or
opposition. Former U.S. National Security Advisor Lt. General Brent Scowcroft has
pointed out that “there is a virtual consensus in the world against an attack on Iraq at this
time” and added that the United States cannot win the war against terrorism “without
enthusiastic international cooperation, especially on intelligence.”
Operational and Logistical Difficulties.  The challenges of a military campaign
could be formidable.  Emergence of a large allied coalition backing a U.S.-led military
campaign against Iraq along the lines of the 1990-1991 Gulf war is unlikely.  Most
regional states have publicly rejected use of their territories as launching pads for such a
campaign, and many observers believe that any cooperation they may provide in
facilitating staging, landing, refueling, and overflight by U.S. forces is likely to be limited.
(See CRS Report RL31533, The Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2002, by Kenneth
Katzman, for a discussion of facilities available in the Gulf region.)  Press reports indicate
that Iraqi defense plans call for abandoning open desert terrain and retreating to Baghdad
and other major cities where U.S. forces could face large-scale urban fighting.  Also,
should Saddam decide that he has nothing to lose in view of U.S. demands for his
elimination, critics are concerned that he would use his chemical and biological warfare
capabilities against allied forces and Israel;8 whereas the prospect of retaining power even
in defeat effectively restrained him from such use during the Gulf war of 1990-1991.
Regional Destabilization.  A U.S. military campaign against Iraq could
precipitate serious turmoil in the Middle East, according to critics of Administration
policy.  Many fear that massive popular demonstrations against the United States and U.S.
interests may occur and could lead to upheavals in which one or more moderate pro-U.S.
leaders were replaced by radical anti-western regimes, possibly headed by Islamic
fundamentalists sympathetic to Al Qaeda.  For example, King Abdullah of Jordan, with
his large Palestinian population and economic dependence on Iraqi oil and commerce,
could be vulnerable in this regard.  U.S. efforts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict would
probably be adversely impacted by a war with Iraq, some believe, with the further loss of
U.S. credibility in large parts of the Arab world.  Some commentators, including the
former commander of U.S. forces in the Gulf region, General Anthony Zinni, see merit
in pursuing an Arab-Israeli peace settlement before moving against Iraq.9
Economic Impact.  Some critics of Administration policy believe that a war with
Iraq could contribute to U.S. economic problems.  Some cost estimates of a war with Iraq
have varied between $100 billion and $200 billion, depending on duration and intensity;
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10 Reuters News Wire, December 31, 2002, 5:29 p.m.  For more information on potential costs,
see CRS Report RL31585, Possible U.S. Military Intervention in Iraq: Some Economic
Consequences, October 1, 2002.  According to a Washington Post article on December 1, 2002,
the $61.1 billion spent on the 1990-1991 war is equivalent to $76.1 billion in 2002 dollars.
however, White House officials were quoted on December 31, 2002 as predicting a cost
closer to the $61.1 billion spent during the Gulf War of 1990-1991.10   In contrast to the
situation in 1990-1991, when Arab and other donors paid $53.6 billion of the $61.1
billion costs incurred by the United States in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,
other countries are unlikely to foot much of the bill for a new campaign against Iraq,
which most of them do not favor.  Beyond the direct budgetary impact, there could be
increases in oil prices and disruptions in oil supply to the United States and its allies,
although such problems proved short-lived during the 1990-1991 crisis.
Uncertain Outcomes.  In conclusion, critics argue, even if an allied force
succeeded in overthrowing the present Iraqi leadership, a post-Saddam Iraq would involve
many uncertainties.  In their view, several unfavorable outcomes are distinctly possible:
an extended U.S. military occupation while attempting to put in place a new order in Iraq;
another dictator who might prove little better than Saddam; a new and more representative
regime which nonetheless retains Saddam’s determination to pursue WMD for reasons
of national prestige and security; or the fragmentation of Iraq along geographic and ethnic
lines.  The latter outcome would be of particular concern to several U.S. allies including
Turkey, which fears that a possible upsurge in Kurdish separatist sentiment in northern
Iraq could spread to Turkey’s own Kurdish population.  More broadly, fragmentation of
Iraq could be exploited by other neighbors such as Iran or Syria or by hostile Islamic
militant groups, with unforeseen consequences to U.S. interests in the Middle East.
